regulatory rules (Eisenhardt, 1989) and often involve Decison-making dilemmas can arise because errors stress due to the need to make choices under time presmay result either from deciding too soon or from de-sure. However, such time stress is often due not so laying decisions too long. Delay can result in lost op-much to strict deadlines as it is to the potential opporportunities or reductions in payoffs from the most ac-tunity cost of delaying decisions. As Eisenhardt (1993, curate decision. This paper investigates decision pro-p. 121) notes, ''the decision-making dilemma in such cesses in environments where there is time stress due environments comes from the fact that it is easy to to the opportunity cost of delaying decisions. First, make mistakes by deciding too soon and equally inefusing computer simulation, the relative accuracy of fective to delay choices or to imitate others.'' In particualternative decision strategies is examined in environlar, delay in deciding can result ''in failure as. . .winments that differ in terms of the levels of opportunity cost of delay. The lexicographic choice rule is shown dows of opportunity close'' (Eisenhardt, 1993, p. 121). to be a very attractive decision process in situations In some cases, the longer the delay in making the deciwhere there is opportunity-cost time pressure. Two ex-sion, the lower the expected return (value) from even periments test the adaptivity of actual decision behav-the most accurate of decisions. For example, if a comior to the presence or absence of opportunity-cost time pany delays a new product introduction to get test marpressure along with variations in goals (accuracy em-ket results, competitors may observe the test, develop phasized vs. effort savings emphasized), dispersion in their own versions of the product, and introduce these probabilities or weights across the outcomes of the versions before the first company finishes test marketchoice options, and the degree of correlation among ing (Ono, 1995) . More generally, the company's prosthe outcomes. Subjects were generally adaptive to oppects may continuously degrade with delay; the longer portunity-cost time pressure. However, failures in the delay, the more effective competitors' responses adaptivity were identified when choice environment may be.
prior research, we develop a set of hypotheses regard-strategies, see Payne et al., 1993 , or Svenson, 1979 .
The strategy a decision maker uses is highly contingent ing adaptivity (and possible failures in adaptivity) to opportunity-cost time pressure and report two experi-upon a host of task and context factors, such as the number of alternatives available, information format, ments that test these hypotheses. Finally, we discuss the implications of the results for adaptive decision response mode, and the correlations among attributes (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; Hammond, 1990; Payne et making. al., 1993) .
1

TIME PRESSURE AND DECISIONS
Given a set of available strategies and facing various task demands, how do people decide how to decide? One Research suggests three major ways in which people framework for explaining contingent decision behavior respond to decision problems under time pressure. focuses on the accuracy and cognitive effort characterFirst, people accelerate their processing (i.e., spend less izing the available strategies ; for time processing each item of information; see Ben related ideas, see Beach & Mitchell, 1978, and BockenZur & Breznitz, 1981) . Second, processing tends to be holt, Albert, Aschenbrenner, & Schmalhofer, 1991) . more selective under time stress, focusing on the more Cognitive effort has been measured by the number of important and/or negative information about alterna-elementary information processing operations (e.g., actives (Ben Zur & Breznitz, 1981; Wallsten, 1993) . quiring an item of information, comparing two pieces Third, decision strategies may shift as a function of of information, or multiplying one value by another) increased time pressure (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, needed to make a decision using a specified decision 1988; Svenson, Edland, & Slovic, 1990) .
rule (Bettman, Johnson, & Payne, 1990) . Accuracy has There may be a hierarchy of responses to time pres-been measured in a variety of ways, including a comsure. Under moderate time pressure, Payne et al. parison of the expected payoff when using a choice heu- (1988) report that their subjects accelerated processing ristic with the expected payoff from using a more norand processed somewhat selectively. Under more se-mative rule like weighted additive value or expected vere time pressure, people accelerated their processing, value maximization. were even more selective, and changed strategies from
The basic hypothesis of the effort/accuracy framea more depth-first (alternative-based) to a more work is that the strategy used to decide represents an breadth-first (attribute-based) pattern of processing as adaptive balancing of the goals of being as accurate as time pressure increased. As discussed in the next sec-possible while conserving limited cognitive resources. tion, this shift in processing pattern is consistent with Although people are often adaptive decision makers, an accuracy/effort framework for strategy selection failures in adaptivity exist. For example, Kleinmuntz .
and Schkade (1993) note that the choice of a strategy The studies cited above all used deadlines to impose for decision making will be based on subjective ex ante time stress (e.g., a time limit of 15 s per choice in Payne estimates of relative effort and accuracy and these estiet al., 1988) . With very few exceptions (e.g., Kerstholt, mates will not always be veridical. Adaptivity may also 1994), the terms ''time pressure'' and ''time constraint'' fail in situations characterized by multiple task or conare used interchangably (Svenson & Maule, 1993) . text variables with differing implications for adaptive Deadlines can make the use of some normative strate-processing. gies impossible due to limits on how much information A number of studies have validated the effort and can be processed in a given time, thus limiting the accuracy model of strategy selection. Creyer, Bettman, range of feasible approaches for adapting to time pres-and Payne (1990) , for example, found that subjects acsure (Keinan, 1987) . Because of our interest in studying quired more information, took more time, were less adaptivity, we focus on situations with opportunity-selective in the processing of information, were more cost time pressure, where there is time stress but a alternative-based, and were more accurate when the broad range of strategies is still possible.
goal was to maximize accuracy rather than to minimize
THE ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKER: AN EFFORT/ ACCURACY FRAMEWORK
effort (see also Stone & Schkade, 1994) . Thus, there was a shift in strategies in the direction that one would predict using the effort/accuracy framework. Stronger tests of the effort/accuracy framework have been conducted by using computer simulations of the effort and accuracy characterizing typical decision strategies to generate hypotheses about processing patterns and then carrying out experimental studies of actual decision behavior to test these hypotheses. Of particular relevance to the present studies, the simula-strategies: when the correlations between outcomes tion model of Payne et al. (1988) showed that certain were negative, implying greater conflict, people inheuristics like the lexicographic rule and elimination-creased their processing and that processing was more by-aspects are actually more accurate than more nor-alternative-based. Importantly, those subjects who mative procedures like additive utility under severe adapted more to different correlation levels performed time deadlines (because there is not enough time to better in the sense of selecting options with higher fully complete the more complex adding rule). The pre-values. ferred strategies under time constraints generally inWe wish to examine how a decision maker might volved processing at least some information about all change his or her strategy for processing information the alternatives as soon as possible (breadth-first or when faced with an opportunity-cost decision environattribute-based strategies). The simulation model also ment. Although the above research provides some guidshowed that heuristics involving attribute-based pro-ance about expected strategy changes, we use computer cessing were relatively more accurate when the disper-simulation to investigate the effects of opportunity-cost sion in probabilities was high rather than low.
2 In ex-time pressure in more detail. In particular, we examine periments with human subjects, people adapted their the relative accuracy of various decision strategies and decision processes in ways consistent with the simula-how opportunity-cost time pressure may interact with tion results (Payne et al., 1988) , shifting decision strat-different context variables that have been previously egies in the direction of more selective and more attri-shown to impact the accuracy of decision strategies bute-based processing under severe time pressure.
(i.e., dispersion in weights and interattribute correlaInterestingly, Eisenhardt (1989) found that manage-tion). The simulation represents an evaluation of differment teams that simultaneously processed two or more ent strategies in various task environments by an idealternatives in a breadth-first fashion made quicker alized adaptive decision maker. We then use the results and better decisions in ''high-velocity'' environments of the simulation and previous research to generate than those teams that processed alternatives using hypotheses for our experiments. more sequential, depth-first (alternative-based) consid-
A SIMULATION INVESTIGATION OF
eration of one alternative at a time (see also Judge & OPPORTUNITY-COST TIME PRESSURE Miller, 1991) . These results suggest that adaptivity in environments characterized by opportunity-cost time The Decision Task pressure may be also involve a shift toward more selecThe decision task in the simulation was a risky tive and more attribute-based processing as time pres-choice. Each decision problem had four alternative sure is increased.
gambles with four outcomes (see Fig. 1 for an example). In addition to adaptivity to salient task factors like Outcome values ranged from $.01 to $9.99. The probatime constraints and goals, people also have been bility that a given outcome occurs (e.g., Outcome 1) is shown to be adaptive to more subtle context factors the same for all alternative gambles. However, each like the dispersion in weights characterizing a decision gamble may have a different payoff for that outcome. problem (Payne et al., 1988) and whether the correla-Such choice problems allow us to easily relate consetion between outcomes is positive or negative (Bett-quences to choice among gambles in our experimental man, Johnson, Luce, & Payne, 1993) . For example, work (i.e., people can play selected gambles for real Bettman et al. (1993) showed that people respond to money). 3 interrattribute correlation by shifting their processing 3 Our risky-choice context with multiple outcomes is structurally 2 To illustrate dispersion of probabilities, a four-outcome alterna-similar to riskless multiattribute choice problems (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976) . Given that a good deal of research on choice processing has tive (gamble) with a low degree of dispersion might have probabilities of . 26, .29, .18, and .27 . Alternatively, a gamble with a high degree used riskless stimuli, much of the terminology describing processing uses the term attribute instead of outcome. We use this standard of dispersion might have probabilities of .56, .06, .14, and .24.
The Decision Strategies
bers of alternatives and attributes difficult. Consequently, we manipulated opportunity-cost time presIn solving choice problems of the kind just described, sure by using the number of elementary information the decision maker must search among the probabili-processing operations (EIPs) needed to complete the ties for each outcome and the values (payoffs) associ-weighted additive rule in the particular decision enviated with the outcomes for each alternative. Different ronment being studied as a standard of comparison. decision strategies can be thought of as different rules To illustrate our approach, refer to the decision probfor conducting that search. In the simulation, we exam-lem given in Fig. 1 . To implement the weighted adding ined six choice rules (equal weight additive value strategy, a decision maker would first read the proba-(EQW), lexicographic (LEX), elimination-by-aspects bility for Outcome 1, then the value for Gamble A on (EBA), satisficing (SAT), weighted additive value Outcome 1, and then multiply these two values. Then (WADD), and random choice (RAND); see Payne et al., he or she would read the probability for Outcome 2, 1993, for definitions). The first four choice rules repre-the value for Gamble A on Outcome 2, multiply these sent heuristics in that potential information is ignored two values, and add that product to the product for (effort is saved) at the cost of a potential loss in choice Outcome 1. This process would continue for all four quality (accuracy is lower). These four heuristics vary outcomes, followed by the same process for Gamble B. substantially in how much information is used and in Then the weighted values for Gamble A and Gamble how the information is used. For instance, the LEX B would be compared. After similar processing for and EBA rules are associated with the use of relatively Gambles C and D, the decision maker would choose limited amounts of information and processing of inforthe gamble with the highest weighted value. Therefore, mation within attributes (attribute-based), whereas using the method for calculating EIPs described in the EQW and SAT rules are associated with processing Payne et al. (1993) , there would be 32 read EIPs (acquiacross attributes (alternative-based). Also, rules like sitions of information), 16 product EIPs (weighting op-LEX, EBA, and SAT tend to be associated with more erations), 12 addition EIPs (compensatory combinaselective processing (i.e., different amounts of informations of information), and 3 comparison EIPs (detion are processed across alternatives or attributes). In termining which of two values is larger) needed to solve general, greater variability or selectivity in search is the problem in Fig. 1 using the WADD rule, for a total associated with the use of noncompensatory decision of 63 EIPs. If a person used WADD or expected value strategies where a good value on one attribute cannot maximization to choose among the alternatives, option compensate for a bad value on another attribute (see D would be selected, with an expected value (weighted Payne, 1976) . The weighted additive rule and the simsum) of $5.44. ple random choice rule represent the complete use of Now consider implementing a lexicographic rule on information and the complete lack of information the same problem. The decision maker would first read search, respectively. The WADD rule also is associated the probability for Outcome 1, then the probability for with consistent processing (the same amount of inforOutcome 2, and then compare the two, retaining the mation is examined for each alternative and attribute), larger. Similarly, the remaining probabilities would be consideration of tradeoffs, and alternative-based proread and compared to ascertain the most probable outcessing of information. Such rules are often viewed as come. Then the values on that outcome for each gamble normative models of how decisions should be made would be read and compared to find the largest value (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976; Frisch & Clemen, 1994) .
on the most probable outcome. The gamble with that largest value would be selected. To solve the problem The Task Variable of Opportunity-Cost Time Pressure in Fig. 1 using the LEX rule would require a total of One could manipulate opportunity-cost time pres-only 17 EIPs (8 reads, 6 comparisons, and 3 elimination sure for a decision problem by reducing the payoff re-operations). The lexicographic choice rule would select ceived as a direct function of the amount of time or option B, with a lower expected value of $5.24. effort spent in making the decision. However, that Dividing the number of EIPs needed to solve the makes comparison across problems with different num-problem using the LEX rule by the number of EIPs needed to solve the same problem using the WADD terminology below. For example, the standard term attribute-based rule indicates that the LEX rule should be about 27% processing describes processing where information on one attribute (17/63) as effortful as the WADD rule. Now assume is examined for several alternatives before another attribute is conthat the decision environment involves an opportunitysidered. In our risky-choice context, that term will refer to examining cost, i.e., there will be value loss due to delay. Further, values for one outcome across several alternatives before considering another outcome.
assume that the value loss to delay means that any outcome received after the time (effort) needed to use a in the simulation. The first context factor varied was the dispersion in probabilities (low vs. high). Probabilicomplete WADD strategy would lose 25% of its original value (i.e., be worth 75% of its original value). For in-ties of .26, .29, .18, and .27 exemplify low dispersion for a four-outcome problem, with probabilities of .56, stance, if the WADD rule were used in such an environment to select option D and Outcome 1 occurred, then .06, .14, and .24 an example of high dispersion. Dispersion in probabilities is a context factor that is relatively the payoff would only be .75 times $7.84, or $5.88. The expected payoff in that case, given the selection of op-easy to notice.
The second context variable was the correlation tion D, would be .75 times the expected value of option D, or $4.08 (.75 times $5.44). More severe opportunity-among the outcome values. This variable was set at negative (high conflict among outcomes, or an average cost environments would be associated with higher losses due to delay and hence receiving lower percent-correlation between outcomes of 0.33), 4 zero, and positive (low conflict, or an average correlation between ages of the original values after the decision was made.
To continue our example, if taking 63 EIPs to solve outcomes of .6). The correlation among outcomes is more difficult to notice than the dispersion in probabilia decision in such an opportunity-cost environment means an expected value loss of 25% (you keep 75%), ties because it requires comparing values for several alternatives on several attributes. A major question what would happen if you were to use a LEX rule to make the decision more quickly? First, use of the LEX examined in our experimental work is how the presence of salient goals and opportunity-cost time presrule would lead to a different choice, i.e., option B, and that option has a lower expected value, $5.24. However, sure may interact with more subtle context factors to determine how, and how well, people adapt their decione would expect that the value loss would not be as great as with the WADD rule since the decision was sion behavior. made more rapidly. We assume that the amount lost Procedure due to delay is proportional to the number of EIPs used by the LEX rule relative to WADD. That is, instead of
The six decision rules were individually applied to a loss of 25%, the loss would be 27% of 25% (i.e., (17/ 1000 decision problems in each of the 24 conditions 63) times 25%), or roughly 6.7%. Then the expected defined by a 4 (levels of time pressure-0, 25, 50, or payoff for the LEX rule would be the EV of Gamble B 75% discount) by 2 (degree of dispersion-low or high) times the proportion of the value retained, or $5.24 by 3 (correlation structure-negative, zero, or positive) times (1 0 .067), or $4.89. More generally, the formula factorial. Payoffs for each problem were randomly genis Expected PAYOFF Å (1 0 ((EIPs Rule /EIPs WADD )* erated from a distribution bounded by 0 (e.g., $0.00) Value Loss))*Expected Value Rule Choice .
and 1000 (e.g., $10.00) using correlation structures Thus, there is some value loss due to using the LEX specified by using the appropriate correlation values rule to decide in the opportunity-cost time pressure between cells (i.e., 0.33, 0, or .6) in the columns of the environment, but it is less than the value loss from Microsoft Excel 5 for Windows spreadsheet representusing the WADD rule. This is true even though the ing each decision problem. The dispersion levels for LEX rule does not select the ''best'' choice in terms of probabilities were generated by using one of two methexpected value. Nevertheless, in this case a quicker ods designed to produce low levels of dispersion or high decision using a generally less accurate heuristic (LEX) levels of dispersion, as appropriate for the condition in yields a higher expected payoff ($4.89) than a slower the simulation (see Johnson & Payne, 1985, p. 402 for decision using the rule which is most accurate when details). The decision rules and simulation were prothere is no time pressure (WADD, $4.08).
grammed using Excel and Decisioneering's Crystal In the simulation, opportunity-cost time pressure or Ball, software for running Monte Carlo simulations usvalue loss (discount) due to delay was varied across ing spreadsheets. 5 four levels: no discount, 25% discount, 50% discount, and 75% discount. These levels represent the loss in 4 It can be shown that for problems with n outcomes, the maximum value if the decision maker uses as many EIPs as the average negative intercorrelation among all pairs of outcomes is [01/ (n 0 1)] (Green & Krieger, 1986 (Bettman et al., 1990) , earlier simulation In addition to the task variable of opportunity-cost work has shown that the simpler equal weight assumption leads to nearly identical conclusions (Payne et al., 1988). time pressure, two context variables were manipulated Note. The 0% discount rate corresponds to no time pressure; a 75% discount rate is the most severe time pressure. WADD, weighted additive strategy; EQW, equal weight strategy; EBA, elimination-by-aspects strategy; LEX, lexicographic strategy; SAT, satisficing strategy; RAND, random strategy. Results are the expected payoff for each strategy based upon 1000 trials.
a The most accurate strategy for each environment.
Results decision goes up (i.e., the discount is larger), the expected payoff from the WADD rule decreases faster Table 1 shows the average payoff values for each of than the payoffs for any of the other choice rules. In the six rules in the 24 simulation conditions. Figure 2 fact, in all the environments WADD provides a payoff shows the results graphically for the 0 correlation, low lower than random choice under the highest levels of and high dispersion conditions. time pressure. First, note that given how the choice options were Each of the choice heuristics has lower payoffs as generated, all the environments are equally friendly in time stress is increased; however, the lexicographic terms of the average payoff due to random choice. Also, rule seems to provide above random payoffs across a by our definition of payoff, the WADD rule provides range of time pressure conditions and across a variety the greatest payoff under no time pressure in all the of different contexts. Thus, shifting to a more attributeenvironments. The no time pressure results from this based decision rule is adaptive for increasing opportusimulation mimic those reported in Payne et al. (1988) nity-cost decision environments, as it was for more and Bettman et al. (1993) . Heuristics often provide pay-time-constrained environments (Payne et al., 1988) . offs close to those provided by the WADD rule; however, which heuristic works best varies according to context
WHEN MAY ADAPTIVITY FAIL?
variables such as the dispersion in probabilities. For example, the EQW simplification generally does relatively better in low dispersion environments and the These simulation results characterize how the accuracy of various decision strategies changes under differ-LEX heuristic does relatively better in the high dispersion environments. Also, all the heuristics do relatively ent levels of opportunity-cost time pressure, dispersion in probabilities, and correlation between outcomes. Our better in environments characterized by positive rather than negative correlation structures.
premise of adaptivity in decision making suggests that the behavior of actual decision makers would correOf greatest interest, however, are the results for differing levels of opportunity-cost time pressure. As is spond, at least directionally, with the behavior of the idealized decision makers studied in the simulations. clear from Table 1 and Fig. 2 , as the cost of delaying a
FIG. 2.
Simulation results for accuracy of heuristics under zero correlation. Note. The 0% discount rate corresponds to no time pressure; a 75% discount rate is the most severe time pressure. WADD, weighted additive strategy; EQW, equal weight strategy; EBA, eliminationby-aspects strategy; LEX, lexicographic strategy; SAT, satisficing strategy; RAND, random strategy. Results are the expected payoff for each strategy based upon 1000 trials.
Although there is a substantial amount of research (1993) point out that some task characteristics will be easier to detect than others and therefore may have support for such adaptivity in decision behavior, adaptivity is not always perfect . a ''disproportionate'' influence on strategy selection. A more general issue is when an information format Under what conditions might adaptivity to task and context demands be limited? Several possibilities are makes the underlying structure of a decision problem nontransparent (Hammond, 1990 ; Tversky & Kahnediscussed in Payne et al. (1993) , including issues of knowledge about properties of choice tasks, knowledge man, 1988).
Adaptation to one task or context factor also may about strategies and their efficacy in various environments, and factors influencing the ability to execute interfere with adaptation to another task or context factor. Even before information search begins, a decistrategies. For instance, Kleinmuntz and Schkade pressure, on average, and lower levels of payoff under no time sion maker may undertake an a priori strategy change pressure. Choices consistent with weighted added types of proon the basis of an obvious task or context variable.
cessing will show the opposite pattern.
Once such a strategy change is set in motion, subjects may be reluctant to shift strategies a second time in Next, we hypothesize that goals impact processing as predicted by the effort/accuracy model of the adaptive response to another less obvious variable. Of course, if the implications for processing and performance are decision maker and as shown in previous research (e.g., Creyer et al., 1990) : the same for multiple task and context variables, there is no dilemma for the decision maker. However, when H2a. A goal emphasizing accuracy will lead to more processing, the implications of adapting to one variable, e.g., goal, less selectivity, and more alternative-based processing than a goal emphasizing effort. dispersion, or correlation structure, are inconsistent with what is required to adapt to another task variable, However, we expect that the results for performance such as opportunity-cost time pressure, problems can will be more complicated. In particular, we expect an arise.
interaction of goals and opportunity-cost time pressure The goal of our experiments is to examine how indi-on performance. As in previous research, we expect a viduals change their processing when there are multi-goal emphasizing accuracy to lead to higher perforple task and context factors with conflicting implica-mance when there is no time pressure. However, we tions for how one should decide. For instance, the goal expect that accuracy goals may lead to lower perforof being as accurate as possible implies more processing mance under opportunity-cost time pressure. People and the use of more normative strategies like WADD. trying to optimize on accuracy rather than effort may The simulation results for opportunity-cost time pres-use strategies that actually lead to lower performance sure, however, suggest that strategies like WADD may levels when the time discount is taken into account. not function well in such time-stressed environments. The accuracy goal may interfere with adaptation to Hence, we might expect that individuals would have time stress by causing people to shift to a more extendifficulties in adapting to an opportunity-cost time sive depth-first strategy rather than a breadth-first pressure environment with accuracy goals.
strategy. This hypothesis is a major focus of our study; as noted above, we believe that when environments
EMPIRICAL HYPOTHESES
vary in multiple ways with conflicting implications for processing, people may at times successfully adapt and The simulation results provide us with more details may at other times exhibit failures in adaptivity. This about the effects of opportunity-cost time pressure. hypothesis also reflects our belief that decision goals Now we use these results, prior research, and the ideas are more salient or have clearer implications for the above to generate hypothesized main effects and inter-individual than opportunity-cost time pressure; many actions for opportunity-cost time pressure, goals, and people may not understand the full implications of dedispersion.
ciding in an opportunity-cost environment. In sum, we First we consider opportunity-cost time pressure. do not expect interactions of time pressure and goal on Based upon the simulation results and the earlier time processing; we believe that people will respond to the pressure studies, we hypothesize goal manipulation in similar ways, regardless of time H1a. Decision makers faced with opportunity-cost time prespressure. However, we do expect an interaction of goal sure will shift decision strategies in the direction of rules like and opportunity-cost time pressure on performance:
lexicographic choice. This shift will be reflected in decreasing H2b. There will be an interaction of goals and opportunity-cost amounts of information processing, increased selectivity in protime pressure on performance: a goal emphasizing accuracy will cessing, and increased use of attribute-based processing.
lead to higher performance levels than a goal emphasizing effort under no time pressure, but an accuracy goal will lead to lower
If decision makers adapt to increased opportunityperformance under opportunity-cost time pressure.
cost time pressure as outlined in H1a, processing characteristic of the lexicographic rule will lead to higher We will test H1a and H2a and H2b in both Experiments payoffs under time pressure. However, under no time One and Two below. H1b will only be tested in Experipressure, such processing will not lead to higher pay-ment One. offs, because the WADD rule yields higher performance Finally, we investigate the impacts of goal and time (and is characterized by more processing, less selective pressure on decision behavior across variations in conprocessing, and more alternative-based processing). text variables previously shown to impact processing Hence, we state (i.e., dispersion in probabilities and correlations between outcomes). We do this for several reasons. First,
H1b. Choices consistent with lexicographic types of processing will result in higher levels of payoff under opportunity cost time responses to the context variables indicate the overall adaptivity of subjects in these experiments; we hope to Again, because of these expected processing effects of negative correlation between outcomes, performance replicate previous findings for the main effects of these factors. Second, and more importantly, we include the should be particularly poor when this condition is combined with opportunity-cost time pressure. More specontext variables in our designs to begin to look at how people deal with problems where there are multiple cifically, we hypothesize task and context variables to which one could adapt.
H4b. Correlation structure and opportunity-cost time pressure
There may be times when successfully adapting to one will interact for performance: performance should be relatively variable may interfere with adaptation to another varipoorer under negative correlation when opportunity-cost time able.
pressure is present.
In our first experiment, we investigate the main efFinally, the specific design of Experiment Two will fects of dispersion in probabilities and the interactions allow us to test a more detailed hypothesis regarding between dispersion and goals and between dispersion adaptivity: and time pressure. In the second experiment, we consider main effects of correlation structure and interacH4c. Those subjects who adapt their processing more to correlations between correlation and goals and between corretion will perform better in the no time pressure condition, but lation and time pressure. Dispersion in probabilities is greater adaptivity of processing to correlation levels will lead to poorer performance under opportunity-cost time pressure.
likely to be easier to detect than differences in correlation structures; however, both dispersion and correlation structure are likely to be more difficult to detect
OVERVIEW OF EXPERIMENTS ONE AND TWO
than variations in goals. As noted above, although opportunity-cost time pressure may be easy to detect, its
The focus of our experiments is how opportunity-cost implications for processing, particularly in combination time pressure, along with variations in goals and conwith other factors, may not be as easy for individuals text factors, influences the details of decision proto determine. Thus, in each case we predict that those cessing. Thus, we utilize a computerized system for changes in the context variables that lead to greater collecting process-tracing data as well as choice data. processing, less selectivity in processing, and more alternative-based processing will interfere with adaptivComputer Software for Data Collection ity to opportunity-cost time pressure. The specific hypotheses for the two context variables are given beSubjects' information acquisitions, response times, low: Hypothesis 3 will be tested in Experiment One and choices were monitored using the Mouselab softand Hypothesis 4 will be tested in Experiment Two.
ware system . For both experiments, For dispersion in probabilities, consistent with the choice stimuli were presented by Mouselab as a matrix results or Payne et al. (1988) , we hypothesize that of available information, with four columns containing
H3a. Low levels of dispersion in probabilities will lead to greater the four outcomes. The first row of boxes in the matrix processing, less selective processing, and more alternative-based contained the probabilities for each of the four outprocessing than high levels of dispersion.
comes; the four remaining rows of boxes contained payBecause we expect factors leading to more extensive, off information for each of four alternative gambles. consistent, and alternative-based processing to inter-The probability values and dollar values were all hidfere with adaptivity to opportunity cost-time pressure, den behind closed boxes that subjects were permitted we also hypothesize to open one at a time by moving a mouse-controlled cursor into a box. In conditions involving time pressure,
H3b. Dispersion and time pressure will interact for expected payoff. Performance will be relatively poorer under low dispera clock appeared in the upper lefthand corner of the sion when low dispersion is combined with opportunity-cost time computer screen and counted down as the subject depressure.
cided. As detailed below, the time on the clock was set so that subjects would generally not run out of time, As noted above for H2b, we do not expect an interaction and the payoff was based on the proportion of time of time pressure and dispersion on the processing variremaining on the clock. Subjects terminated decision ables.
processing by clicking a mouse button while in Next, we predict that the main effects of correlation a''choice'' box corresponding to one of the four available on processing will replicate those reported in Bettman gambles. The Mouselab program recorded the order in et al. (1993) : which boxes were opened, the time spent in each box, H4a. More negative correlation structures will lead to greater and the chosen option, allowing for the construction of processing, less selectivity in processing, and more alternativebased processing than more positive correlation structures.
several dependent variables.
Dependent Variables a particular decision problem. Higher values of PTMI should characterize more lexicographic-like processing. Accuracy and choice measures. The primary meaThe seventh processing measure reflects the sesure of choice accuracy, PAYOFF, was simply the ex-quence in which dollar value information is acquired. pected payoff for each subject's chosen option. For no Given the acquisition of a particular piece of value intime pressure trials, this was simply the expected value formation, the two cases of most interest for the next of the chosen alternative. For time pressure trials, this acquisition are acquiring information on the same alexpected value was multiplied by the proportion of time ternative but a different outcome (an alternative-based left on the clock after decision processing was com-transition) and obtaining information on the same outpleted: PAYOFF Å Chosen Gamble EV*(1 0 (Time come but a different alternative (an attribute-based Taken/Total Time on the Clock)). Finally, to control for transition).
6 A simple measure of the relative degree of differences in the stimulus sets, PAYOFF was divided alternative-based versus attribute-based processing is by the maximum expected value for any option of the calculated by subtracting the total number of attributedecision set to yield a measure called RELPAY. Thus, based transitions for a trial from the total number of RELPAY Å (PAYOFF/Maximum Possible EV in the alternative-based transitions for a trial and dividing Decision Set). Both PAYOFF and RELPAY thus reflect this difference by the sum of the attribute-based plus discounts due to time pressure. The results for the the alternative-based transitions (Payne, 1976) . This PAYOFF and RELPAY measures were essentially the measure of the relative degree of alternative-based versame, and we focus on the results for PAYOFF. How-sus attribute-based decision processing of value inforever, we include the results for RELPAY in the tables mation is denoted PATTERN and ranges from a value to aid interpretation.
of 01.0 (indicating totally attribute-based processing) Two additional measures characterizing subjects' to a value of 1.0 (indicating totally alternative-based chosen alternatives were calculated and used to exam-processing). ine H1b. These binary measures reflect whether the These processing measures can be related to the decialternative chosen is the alternative that would be indi-sion strategies. The WADD rule, which examines all cated by the expected value maximization rule (EV-information, should have high values for TIME, ACQ, MAX) or the lexicographic rule (LEXMAX). Note that and TPERACQ; low values for VARATT and VARALT; for a particular decision, the alternative with the high-low values for PTMI; and high values for PATTERN. est expected value may also be the alternative with the The EQW strategy should have relatively high values best value on the most important attribute, so both for TIME, ACQ, and TPERACQ; low values for VARthe expected value maximization and the lexicographic ATT and VARALT; low values for PTMI; and high valrules may indicate that the same gamble is best.
ues for PATTERN. The EBA and LEX rules, since they do not process all available information, involve simProcessing variables. The information acquisition pler processing operations, and focus on the most probdata recorded by Mouselab were used to create seven able outcome, should have lower values for TIME, variables reflecting aspects of subjects' decision pro-ACQ, and TPERACQ; higher values for VARATT and cessing. First, the variable TIME reflects total pro-PTMI; and lower values for PATTERN (more attributecessing and is simply the total time spent for a choice based). For VARALT, the LEX rule should have lower trial. The variable ACQ (acquisitions) also reflects the values and EBA should have higher values. Finally, total amount of processing, and is calculated by sum-the SAT rule should have lower values for TIME, ACQ, ming the total number of times information (e.g., prob-and TPERACQ; higher values for VARALT; relatively ability or dollar payoff) boxes were opened for a particu-lower values for VARATT and PTMI; and high values lar trial. Finally, a third measure of the amount of for PATTERN. processing is the average time spent per acquisition of an item of information, denoted TPERACQ.
EXPERIMENT ONE
The next three variables reflect selectivity in decision processing. Two measures are the variances in the pro-Method portions of time spent on each attribute (VARATT) and Subjects. Seventy-two undergraduate students paron each alternative (VARALT). Lower values for these ticipated in this experiment to fulfill a course requiretwo variables indicate that decision processing was ment. Subjects were also entered into one of two $50.00 more evenly spread over all four attributes or alternatives, respectively. The third selectivity measure, PTMI, is the proportion of the total time spent on boxes 6 Recall that we retain the term attribute-based processing here to remain consistent with the literature on decision processing.
involving the values of the most probable outcome for lotteries, although they were unaware of this addi-noticeable to subjects. Within each block, stimuli were individually randomized for each subject, and which of tional compensation when they volunteered for the study. Subjects were run individually, and experimen-the two blocks was presented first was counterbalanced across subjects. tal sessions took roughly 45 min to complete. Each subject was randomly assigned to a condition involving Time pressure manipulation. Subjects were aseither no or severe time pressure; 36 subjects were assigned to either a no time pressure or a severe opportusigned to each of the no and severe time pressure condinity-cost time pressure group. In the severe opportutions.
7 Thus, opportunity-cost time pressure was manity-cost time pressure condition, a clock appeared in nipulated between subjects.
the upper lefthand corner of the computer screen and Stimuli and manipulation of dispersion. Stimuli counted down as subjects made their decisions. Subwere 32 sets of four risky options, each involving dif-jects in the time pressure group were informed that fering dollar payoffs for four possible outcomes. Every their payoff or winnings for each trial would be equal option in a set was defined in terms of the same four to the amount of money their chosen alternative paid outcome probabilities, and probability values were con-for the outcome occurring multiplied by the proportion strained to sum to 1.0. Possible payoffs ranged from of time left on the clock when a final decision was indi-$0.01 to $9.99.
cated. Thus, subjects completing a decision in 25% of Subjects considered 8 decision sets with low disper-the available time would receive 75% of the chosen sion in outcome probabilities, and 8 decision sets with gamble's payoff, while subjects completing a decision high dispersion in outcome probabilities. These stimuli using 75% of the available time would receive only 25% are a subset of those in Payne et al. (1988) . The correla-of the chosen gamble's payoff. The clock was protions between dollar values for each of the four attri-grammed to count down over 30 s; subjects were not butes were zero on average, and no dominated alterna-told how much time was on the clock.
8 Based on on the tives were included in the sets. Subjects considered prior results of Payne et al. (1988) and Bettman et al. each of the 16 decision sets twice, once under an accu-(1993), 30 s exceeded the time needed to perform the racy goal and once under an effort goal, described fur-task. ther below. Thus, both dispersion and goal were manipSince we intended to have an opportunity-cost manipulated within subjects.
ulation of time pressure and not a deadline manipulation, there would be a problem if many subjects ran out Procedure. All instructions and stimuli were preof time. However, only 7 of the 1152 decisions made by sented via the Mouselab program. Subjects read that the subjects in the time-pressured condition took more the purpose of the experiment was to understand how than 30 s. Thus, subjects almost always made a decision people make decisions and that there were no right or before the value of the expected payoff was $0. 9 wrong answers. After becoming familiar with Mouselab, Four practice problems involving feedback were subjects received experimental task instructions and given to facilitate understanding of the time pressure completed four practice decisions, one for each of the environments. Immediately after each practice probpossible goal by dispersion conditions. For the first two lem, a screen with feedback appeared. In the time prespractice decisions, all of the boxes on the computer sure group, the feedback screens reported the subject's screen remained open during decision processing to chosen gamble, the outcome occurring (outcomes were allow subjects to learn about the structure of the decirandomly generated according to their stated probabilisions. Subjects received feedback on their payoffs for ties), the monetary payoff associated with the relevant each of their four practice decisions.
gamble/outcome pair, the proportion of clock time used, The 32 experimental stimuli were separated into two and the adjusted payoff (equal to the appropriate payoff blocks, with the two members of each effort/accuracy multiplied by the proportion of time left on the clock). goal pair always presented in differing blocks. The rows For the no time pressure group, feedback screens reand columns of the sets were permuted between the two goal conditions so that this repetition would be less 8 Subjects in the two studies reported below used an average of 7 An additional 20 subjects were initially assigned to a moderate roughly 12 s of the 30 s available. Thus, on average their winnings were discounted by 40%. level of opportunity-cost time pressure. Preliminary results indicated that means for the moderate time pressure condition tended to sim-9 As a comparison, the subjects under the most severe time constraint in Payne et al. (1988) , 15 s, ran out of time about 74% of the ply fall between those for the no time pressure and severe time pressure conditions, so the moderate time pressure group was time. Of course, in their time constraint task, choice of a particular option led to the same payoff regardless of how much time was taken dropped from the experimental design midway through data collection.
to choose that option.
ported the subject's chosen alternative, the outcome scale where higher numbers indicated a greater feeling of being hurried or time-pressured. The effect of opporoccurring, and the associated monetary payoff.
tunity-cost time pressure on HURRIED was significant Goal manipulation. Before each decision trial, sub-(Means: none Å 3.99, severe Å 5.51, F(1,70) Å 26.3, p jects viewed a computer screen instructing them as to õ .0001), indicating that the manipulation of opportuwhether their task for the particular trial involved a nity-cost time pressure was successful in generating relative focus on maximizing accuracy or on minimiz-feelings of being hurried. ing effort. Subjects were instructed that minimizing effort involved making a choice in as little time as possi-Results ble. In order to explain the goal of maximizing accuMultivariate analysis. Because we expected the deracy, examples were used. One example illustrated the pendent variables to be intercorrelated, we initially importance of probability values (i.e., that a .75 chance performed a multivariate analysis of variance with deat $10.00 was better than a .50 chance at $10.00), and pendent variables PAYOFF, ACQ, TIME, TPERACQ, a second illustrated the importance of dollar values VARATT, VARALT, PTMI, and PATTERN. 10 EVMAX (i.e., that a .75 chance at $20.00 was better than a . 75 and LEXMAX were not included because they are bichance at $10.00). Subjects were instructed that they nary variables. The main effects for time pressure should attend to both payoffs and probabilities ''in com-(F(8,63) Å 98.1, p õ .0001), goal (F(8,63) Å 9.9, p õ bination'' in order to effectively maximize decision ac-.0001), and dispersion (F(8,63) Å 10.5, p õ .0001) were curacy, although subjects were not explicitly instructed all highly significant. Likewise, there was a significant regarding normatively accurate decision rules or operainteraction of time pressure by goal (F(8,63) Å 4.1, p tions like the WADD rule. Subjects were explicitly told õ .0001). The interaction of time pressure by disperthat ''maximizing accuracy involves winning the most sion was marginally significant (F(8,63) Å 1.9, p õ .08), money possible,'' and the feedback screens presented and the dispersion by goal interaction was not signifiduring the practice trials reported the subject's monecant (F(8,2004 ) Å 1.15, ns). The three way interaction tary payoff for the preceding decision, adjusted for time between time pressure, goal, and dispersion was also pressure if the subject was in the time pressure condinot significant (F(8,2004 ) Å 0.45, ns). The means for tion.
the dependent variables for each time pressure, goal, Finally, subjects were told that both minimizing efand dispersion condition are reported in Table 2 . Next, fort and maximizing accuracy were important for every the univariate tests for the various process and outtrial, but that trials would differ in the degree to which come measures are presented. a relative focus on accuracy or on effort was required. Specifically, subjects were told that a score reflecting Main effects of time pressure. As stated in H1a, we effort minimization and a score reflecting accuracy expected higher opportunity-cost time pressure to be maximization would be computed for each trial. On associated with decreased amounts of processing (lower effort minimization trials, subjects were informed that values for ACQ, TIME, and TPERACQ), more selective effort would count three times as heavily as accuracy processing (higher values for VARATT, VARALT, and in computing a total score for that trial. Similarly, on PTMI), and more attribute-based processing (a lower accuracy maximization trials, accuracy was to be value for PATTERN). weighted three times as heavily as effort. In order to Opportunity-cost time pressure had the expected reinforce the goal manipulation and to ensure that sub-main effects on ACQ (Means: none Å 24.6, severe Å jects did not forget their goal task, a reminder line 15.4, F(1,70) Å 20.4, p õ .0001), TIME (Means: none appeared at the bottom of each choice screen. For each accuracy trial, this line read ''TOTAL SCORE Å (3) 10 We expected several of the process and outcome measures to (ACCURACY) / (1) (EFFORT).'' Analogous wording be correlated. Generally speaking, as our reasoning regarding the was used for each effort trial. Subjects were told that hypotheses implies, measures of amount of processing will be negathey would be entered in a $50.00 lottery if their total tively correlated with measures of selectivity and positively correscores exceeded an unspecified cutoff value. However, lated with the degree of alternative-based processing. Selectivity will generally be negatively correlated with the degree of alternativeall subjects were entered into the lottery. Similar goal based processing. These expectations were borne out by correlations manipulations had been successfully used in Creyer et (all significant at p õ .0001) between ACQ and VARATT (r Å 0.61),
al. (1990).
TIME and VARATT (r Å 0.50), ACQ and VARALT (r Å 0.24), TIME and VARALT (r Å 0.18), ACQ and PATTERN (r Å .49), TIME and Manipulation check. At the end of the experiment, PATTERN (r Å .37), and VARATT and PATTERN (r Å 0.80). The subjects were asked how hurried they had felt during correlation between VARALT and PATTERN was not significant (r Å 0.02).
the experiment (HURRIED), rated on a seven-point Note. ACQ, number of acquisitions; TIME, time taken; TPERACQ, time per acquisition; VARATT, variance in the proportion of time spent on each attribute; VARALT, variance in the proportion of time spent on each alternative; PTMI, proportion of time spent on the most important attribute; PATTERN, index reflecting relative amount of attribute-based (0) and alternative-based (/) processing; RELPAY, expected amount won divided by the maximum amount which could be won; PAYOFF, expected amount won; EVMAX, proportion of highest expected value choices; LEXMAX, proportion of choices highest on the most probable outcome.
Å 22.2, severe Å 12.5, F(1,70) Å 25.0, p õ 0001), and within subjects manipulation. We will consider this issue again below. TPERACQ (Means: none Å 0.52, severe Å 0. 42, F(1,70) Now we consider the effects of opportunity-cost time Å 15.9, p õ .0003). People not only processed less inforpressure on performance, as stated in H1b and H2b. mation under opportunity-cost time pressure but also We consider H2b below in the section on time pressure processed it faster.
by goal interactions. H1b states that choices consistent Time pressure had the expected directional effects with lexicographic processing will result in higher payon variables reflecting selectivity, but the results were offs under opportunity-cost time pressure and lower not significant for VARATT (Means: none Å 0.062, sepayoffs under no time pressure. Choices consistent vere Å 0.081, F(1,70) Å 2.60, p õ .12) or PTMI (Means:
with maximizing expected value should exhibit the opnone Å 0.34, severe Å 0.36, F(1,70) Å 2.29, p õ .14).
posite pattern. For VARALT, time pressure had a marginally signifiWe use LEXMAX and EVMAX to examine this hycant main effect (Means: none Å 0.018, severe Å 0.023, pothesis. LEXMAX is the proportion of choices select-F(1,70) Å 3.03, p õ .09). Thus, there is only weak suping the option that would be chosen by the lexicoport for increased selectivity under increasing time graphic rule (i.e., best on the most probable outcome), pressure.
while EVMAX is the proportion of choices selecting the Finally, time pressure had the expected directional option that would be chosen by the WADD rule (i.e., effect on PATTERN, but this effect was not significant the option with the highest expected value). Given the (Means: none Å 00.14, severe Å 00.230, F(1,70) Å stimuli in Experiment One, LEXMAX and EVMAX are 0.67). To summarize, opportunity-cost time pressure negatively correlated (r Å 0.60, p õ .0001). 11 The pathad the same directional effects on processing as the terns of correlations between the processing measures more traditional constraint form of time pressure: inand LEXMAX and EVMAX are as expected: LEXMAX creased time pressure lead to less processing, faster or is negatively correlated with ACQ (r Å 0.28), TIME (r accelerated processing, somewhat more selectivity, and a directional change to more attribute-based processing. The results were weaker than those in the Å 0.22), and PATTERN (r Å 0.39) and positively with TERN: Means: accuracy Å 00.12, effort Å 00.26, VARATT (r Å .44); EVMAX is positively correlated with F(1,70) Å 22.9, p õ .0001) . A shift in goal leads not ACQ (r Å .18), TIME (r Å .12), and PATTERN (r Å .29) only to different amounts of processing, therefore, but and negatively with VARATT (r Å 0.32)(all significant also to shifts in strategy. In sum, the main effects for at p õ .0001).
goal strongly support H2a. The data most directly relevant to testing H1b are the correlations between LEXMAX and PAYOFF and Time pressure by goal interactions. We did not exbetween EVMAX and PAYOFF for the two time pres-amine main effects for opportunity-cost time pressure sure conditions. If H1b is true, we expect that LEXMAX or goal on PAYOFF, because our primary hypothesis will be positively correlated with PAYOFF under time regarding performance, H2b, was that opportunity-cost pressure and will be negatively correlated under no time pressure and goal would interact to determine time pressure, with the opposite pattern expected for PAYOFF. Accuracy goals were expected to have dif-EVMAX. The correlation between LEXMAX and PAY-fering implications for adaptive performance than op-OFF is .23 (p õ .0001) under time pressure, as ex-portunity-cost time pressure does. In particular, we arpected, and is nonsignificant (r Å .04, ns) under no gued that a goal emphasizing accuracy would lead to time pressure. The correlation between EVMAX and higher payoffs than a goal emphasizing effort in the PAYOFF is negative but nonsignificant under time absence of time pressure, but that a goal emphasizing pressure (r Å 0.02, ns) and is positive when there is accuracy would actually lead to lower payoffs than a no time pressure (r Å .36, p õ .0001). These results goal emphasizing effort under opportunity-cost time support H1b.
pressure. Further evidence that performance is related to
The expected interaction of time pressure by goal on shifts in strategy under time pressure is provided by PAYOFF was significant (F(1,70) Å 29.43, p õ .0001) correlations between processing measures and PAY-and of the anticipated form. Under no time pressure, OFF. In the time pressure condition, VARATT (r Å accuracy goals led to higher payoffs ($5.72) than effort .51), VARALT (r Å .23), PTMI (r Å .13), and PATTERN goals ($5.66), at a cost of 5 more s of processing time (r Å 0.36) are all correlated with PAYOFF at p õ .0001. (see Table 2 ). However, under opportunity-cost time Thus, more attribute-based and selective processing pressure, the expected payoff received for the accuracy (such as in LEX) leads to higher PAYOFF under time goal ($3.07) was $.46 less than the expected payoff repressure. In contrast, the correlations between pro-ceived for the effort goal ($3.53); subjects processed cessing variables and PAYOFF were all slightly posi-about two and a half seconds longer in the accuracy tive and nonsignificant under no time pressure.
condition (see Table 2 ). These results provide strong support for H2b. Main effects of goal. According to H2a, a goal emThis detrimental effect of the accuracy goal in the phasizing accuracy should lead to more processing, less time pressure conditions was not due to subjects choosselectivity, and more alternative-based processing ing alternatives with relatively lower undiscounted ex- (Creyer et al., 1990) . The results generally were consispected values. The interaction between time pressure tent with the above expectations. and goal was not significant for the EVMAX measure Subjects processed more extensively under an accu-(x 2 (1, n Å 2296) Å .04, ns)(since EVMAX is a 0-1 racy goal, making more acquisitions (ACQ: Means: acvariable, a logit analysis was used). The interaction curacy Å 22.6, effort Å 17.7, F(1,70) Å 48.6, p õ .0001), between time pressure and goal was also not significant taking more time (TIME: Means: accuracy Å 19.2, effor the LEXMAX measure (x 2 (1, n Å 2296) Å .14, ns). fort Å 15.5, F(1,70) Å 38.6, p õ .0001), and spending
We did not expect opportunity-cost time pressure and more time per acquisition (TPERACQ: Means: accugoal to interact for our processing measures, and this racy Å 0.49, effort Å 0. 45, F(1,70) notion that responding to goals may interfere with apFinally, subjects processed information in a more alternative-based manner under an accuracy goal (PAT-propriate reactions to time pressure.
Effects involving dispersion. In H3a we argued that accuracy and effort (the ''total score'' described above lower dispersion in probabilities would lead to greater in the procedure), not accuracy alone. Hence, subjects' amounts of processing, less selective processing, and lower payoffs under accuracy goals and time pressure more alternative-based processing. Lower dispersion is may reflect their attempts to balance accuracy and efassociated with higher values of ACQ (Means: low Å fort, and these attempts cannot be measured by payoff 21.4, high Å 18.6, F(1,70) Å 27.8, p õ .001) and TIME scores alone. However, subjects under an accuracy goal (Means: low Å 18.2, high Å 16.5, F(1,70) Å 15.7, p õ both received lower payoffs and took more time under .001), but there is no main effect on TPERACQ (Means: opportunity-cost time pressure than subjects under eflow Å .47, high Å . 47, F(1,70) Å 1.33) . Lower dispersion fort goals. The time pressure performance of subjects is also associated with lower values of VARATT under an accuracy goal was thus dominated by subjects (Means: low Å .058, high Å . 085, F(1,70) Å 40.3, p õ under an effort goal on both components of ''total score,'' .0001) and PTMI (Means: low Å .33, high Å . 37, F(1,70) payoffs and time. Thus, we believe that our results Å 9.4, p õ .01), but there is no significant effect on provide clear evidence of failures in adaptivity. VARALT (Means: low Å .019, high Å . 022, F(1,70) Å Finally, lower dispersion in probabilities generally 2.4). Finally, low dispersion led to higher values for led to greater processing, less selective processing, and PATTERN (Means: low Å 0.09, high Å 0.29, F(1,70) more alternative-based processing, supporting H3a. Å 29.9, p õ .0001). Thus, H3a is generally supported. Contrary to H3b, however, there was no interaction of H3b proposed that there would be an interaction be-dispersion and time pressure on payoff. tween dispersion and time pressure on PAYOFF, beIn sum, Experiment One yields several very interestcause the processing which is characteristic of low dis-ing results regarding adaptivity to time pressure, parpersion conflicts with the processing which is adaptive ticularly those for H1b and H2b. The results for goal for time pressure. Unfortunately, the time pressure by and dispersion on processing variables were generally dispersion interaction for PAYOFF was not significant as expected, but those for time pressure were some-(F(1,70) Å 1.05), and H3b is not supported.
what weak. The manipulations for goal and dispersion were within subjects, whereas opportunity-cost time Discussion pressure was varied between subjects. In general, a between subjects design provides subjects with inThe effects of opportunity-cost time pressure on decicreased experience with whatever opportunity-cost sion processing were in the directions hypothesized in time pressure decisions they are facing. However, a H1a (less processing, more selectivity, more attributewithin subjects manipulation of time pressure provides based), but the results did not all reach significance.
an even stronger test of adaptivity, since subjects must H1b was supported, however; choices consistent with switch strategies from one trial to the next to be adaplexicographic processing resulted in higher payoffs untive. A within-subjects design also controls for individder time pressure but did not under no time pressure, ual differences in preferred processing patterns. with the reverse being true for choices consistent with
We ran a version of Experiment One with 42 subjects maximizing expected value. These results are imwhere opportunity-cost time pressure, goal, and disperportant, because they show that subjects who adapt in sion were all manipulated within subjects. In this exways suggested by previous work and the simulation periment, the effects of time pressure on processing attain higher payoffs under time pressure.
were strongly significant in the expected directions for Goals emphasizing accuracy have the effects preall variables except VARALT. In addition, the imdicted in H2a, leading to more processing, less selectivportant time pressure by goal interaction on PAYOFF ity, and more alternative-based processing. Perhaps was also significant (p õ .002) and in the direction our most important result, however, is finding support expected in H2b ($6.04 for accuracy, no time pressure; for an interaction of goals and opportunity-cost time $5.98 for effort, no time pressure; $3.25 for accuracy, pressure on payoffs, as hypothesized in H2b. A goal time pressure; $3.56 for effort, time pressure). Obemphasizing accuracy leads to higher performance taining this interaction both between and within subthan a goal emphasizing effort under no time pressure, jects provides strong support for our notions about failbut under opportunity-cost time pressure accuracy ures in adaptivity. Finally, the main effects of goal and goals lead to lower performance than effort goals. This dispersion are as expected in H2a and H3a, but the result shows that adaptivity can be compromised in expected time pressure by dispersion interaction on situations with multiple factors with conflicting impli-PAYOFF is again not significant. cations for adaptive processing.
Thus, the within subjects version of Experiment One An alternative explanation of these results is that subjects were asked to optimize some combination of bolsters confidence in our results. We decided to also use a within subjects design for Experiment Two and to decisions (probability values ranged from .18 to .30).
Also, decision sets contained either negative or positive examine another context variable, correlation between outcomes. It is important to replicate both the effects correlation between outcomes for Experiment Two, rather than the zero correlation that was characteristic of opportunity-cost time pressure on processing and the important time pressure by goal interaction on payoffs. of the stimuli for Experiment One.
Thirty-two decision problems were constructed from It is also critical to generalize such results over different context variables, such as correlation, that have 8 core stimuli, 4 with positive correlation between outcomes, and 4 with negative correlation. These 8 stimuli been shown to affect processing and performance, especially the time pressure by correlation interaction on were a subset of the stimuli used for Experiment One in Bettman et al., 1993 . For negatively correlated trials, payoffs proposed in H4b.
correlations between the values for pairs of outcomes EXPERIMENT TWO ranged from 0.78 to 0, with an average value of 0.31. For positively correlated trials, correlations ranged We manipulated opportunity-cost time pressure from .16 to .86, with an average value of .60. Each of (none or severe), goal (effort or accuracy), and correla-the 8 decision sets was considered 4 times, once under tion between outcomes (positive or negative) in a com-each of the time pressure (none/severe) and goal (accuplete within subjects design. Correlation can have a racy/effort) conditions. The rows and columns of the major impact on the relative accuracy of choice heuris-dollar values comprising the decision sets were pertics, and people are adaptive to changes in correlation muted between differing conditions, in order to mask structures . Hence, we hypothe-this repetition. size that people will adjust their processing in response Procedure. The procedure was very similar to that to correlation, as proposed in H4a. More importantly, in Experiment One and again used the Mouselab syswe expect that adapting to negative correlation by protem. Practice trials including feedback were provided cessing more, being less selective, and processing more to the subjects to facilitate learning about the structure by alternative will lead to decreased adaptivity to opof the decisions and the time pressure manipulation. portunity-cost time pressure. In particular, we expect
The 32 experimental stimuli were separated into two performance to be relatively poorer under negative corblocks, with each member of an effort/accuracy goal relation when time pressure is present (H4b) and that stimulus pair always presented in differing blocks. increased adaptivity to correlation will lead to higher Which of the two blocks was presented first was counperformance under no time pressure but lower perforterbalanced across subjects, and stimuli were individumance under time pressure (H4c). The latter prediction ally randomized for each subject within each block. can be tested in Experiment Two because of special features in the stimuli, explained in detail below.
Time pressure and goal manipulations. The goal Finally, Experiment Two seeks to replicate the ef-manipulation was identical to that used in Experiment fects of time pressure and goal on processing (H1a and One. The time pressure manipulation was impleH2a) and the crucial interaction of opportunity-cost mented by adapting the opportunity-cost time pressure time pressure and goal on decision performance (H2b). manipulation from Experiment One to a within-subWe again expect an accuracy goal to lead to poorer jects environment. Thus, half of subjects' decisions inperformance under time pressure but better perfor-volved no time pressure, and the other half involved mance without time pressure.
opportunity-cost time pressure. For the time pressure trials, a clock appeared on the computer screen and Method counted down for 30 s (trials with no time pressure were immediately recognizable, because there was no Subjects. Seventy-six undergraduate students parclock on the screen). In order to ensure that subjects ticipated in this experiment in order to fulfill a course understood the time pressure environments, they inirequirement. Subjects were entered into a $50.00 lottially completed and received feedback concerning four tery in addition to receiving course credit, although practice problems, two with time pressure and two they were unaware of the lottery when they volunwithout. Subjects took 30 s or longer only 11 times of teered for the study. Subjects were run individually, 1216 time pressure trials. and sessions took roughly 45 min to complete.
Stimuli and manipulation of interattribute correla-
Manipulation checks. Subjects were asked to make eight decisions at the end of the experimental task, one tion. Stimuli were identical in structure to those used for Experiment One. However, for Experiment Two, from each of the time pressure by goal by correlation cells (the order was randomized for each individual the dispersion in attribute probabilities was low for all subject). After each of these decisions, subjects were across alternatives (VARALT: Means: none Å 0.021, severe Å 0.021, F(1,2276) Å 0.1, ns). Subjects also foasked to assess (on seven-point scales) how hurried they had felt during the previous decision (HURRIED), cused more on dollar values pertaining to the most probable outcome under time pressure (PTMI: Means: how stressful they had found the previous decision to be (STRESSFUL) , and the degree to which they noticed none Å 0.46, severe Å 0.49, F(1,2276) Å 9.0, p õ .003).
Finally, subjects tended to process more by attribute positive or negative interattribute correlation in the relevant decision problem (CORREL: ''Please indicate under time pressure, as indicated by the main effect of time pressure on PATTERN (Means: none Å 0.10, sethe degree to which you feel that a gamble with a high (low) value on one outcome would tend to have low vere Å 0. 03, F(1,2261) (F(8,2254 ) Å hypothesis regarding decision accuracy (H2b) was 4.5, p õ .0001), and goal and correlation (F(8,2254) that accuracy goals were expected to be associated Å 7.8, p õ .0001) were all significant. Finally, the with higher performance in the absence of time presthree way interaction between time pressure, goal, sure, but with lower performance under time presand correlation was not significant (F(8,2254 ) Å 1.26, sure. ns). The means for the dependent measures by time The expected time pressure by goal interaction pressure, goal, and correlation are presented in Ta- was found for PAYOFF (F(1,2341) Å 41.1, p õ .0001). ble 3. The univariate tests for the various process Subjects actually received lower payoffs with an acand outcome measures are given below.
curacy goal in time-pressured environments (accuracy Å $3.42, effort Å $3.86), and this result was Main effects of time pressure. Overall, the effects of opportunity-cost time pressure on processing were reversed under no time pressure (accuracy Å $6.16, effort Å $6.05). Note that the expected payoff resignificant and in the directions hypothesized by H1a. Subjects under time pressure processed less exten-ceived under the accuracy goal in the time-pressured condition was $.44 less than the expected payoff resively. Time pressure was associated with lower values for ACQ (Means: none Å 22.2, severe Å 17.4, F(1,2341) ceived under the effort goal, and choices in the accuracy, time-pressured condition took two and a half Å 143.1, p õ .0001), TIME (Means: none Å 15.5, severe Å 12.1, F(1,2341) Å 159.4, p õ .0001), and TPERACQ seconds longer than the choices in the effort, timepressured condition. Once again, the time pressure (Means: none Å 0.40, severe Å 0.38, F(1,2282) Å 53.3, p õ .0001).
by goal interaction for EVMAX was not signicant (x 2 (1, n Å 2424) Å .00, ns), indicating that these results Under time pressure, subjects were more selective across attributes (VARATT: Means: none Å 0.046, se-were not due to subjects choosing gambles with relatively lower undiscounted expected values more frevere Å 0.054, F(1,2276) Å 26.8, p õ .0001), but not Note. ACQ, number of acquisitions; TIME, time taken; TPERACQ, time per acquisition; VARATT, variance in the proportion of time spent on each attribute; VARALT, variance in the proportion of time spent on each alternative; PTMI, proportion of time spent on the most important attribute; PATTERN, index reflecting relative amount of attribute-based (0) and alternative-based (/) processing; RELPAY, expected amount won divided by the maximum amount which could be won; PAYOFF, expected amount won; EVMAX, proportion of highest expected value choices; LEXMAX, proportion of choices highest on the most probable outcome.
quently under time pressure. Thus, our important probable outcome (PTMI: Means: negative Å 0.47, positive Å 0.48, F(1,2276) Å 6.3, p õ .02). However, there interaction prediction documenting limits to adaptivity is replicated in all three of our studies. was no effect on VARATT (Means: negative Å .050, positive Å .051, F(1,2276) Å 1.3). As expected, there were few significant time pressure by goal interactions for processing variables, namely Finally, in contrast to the results reported in Bettman et al. (1993) , subjects did not shift to more alternafor ACQ (F(1,2341) Å 11.2, p õ .001) and TIME (F(1,2341) Å 12.4, p õ .001). Thus, once again, subjects tive-based processing when faced with negative correlations between outcomes (PATTERN: Means: negative respond similarly to different goals regardless of the level of time pressure.
Å 0.07, positive Å 0.06, F(1,2261) Å .67, ns). Thus, H4a is generally supported, with the exception of the results Effects involving correlation. As stated in H4a, we for VARATT and PATTERN. expect that negative correlation between outcomes will be associated with more processing, less selectivity, Time pressure by correlation interactions. One major reason for including correlation in the experimental and more alternative-based processing, reflecting that strategies like WADD are needed to achieve higher ac-design was that we hypothesized a two-way interaction between opportunity-cost time pressure and correlacuracy levels with negative correlation.
Subjects expended more effort when the correlations tion on PAYOFF. In particular, as stated in H4b, we expect that performance will be relatively more poor were negative, with significantly higher means for ACQ (Means: negative Å 22.2, positive Å 17.4, F(1,2341) Å under negative correlation when opportunity-cost time pressure is present. As expected, this interaction was 141.8, p õ .0001), TIME (Means: negative Å 15.3, positive Å 12.4, F(1,2341) Å 118.0, p õ .0001), and a marginally significant (F(1,2341) Å 25.5, p õ .0001). Under no time pressure, payoffs were $7.05 for positive and $5.16 for significant effect for TPERACQ (Means: negative Å 0.392, positive Å 0.388, F(1,2282) Å 2.8, p õ .10). negative correlation; under opportunity-cost time pressure, the payoffs were $4.37 for positive and $2.92 for With negative correlations between outcomes, subjects were less selective over alternatives (VARALT: negative correlation. As hypothesized, performance for negative correlation is relatively poorer under time Means: negative Å 0.018, positive Å 0.024, F(1,2276) Å 26.0, p õ .0001) and spent a relatively lower propor-pressure: the payoff for negative correlation is 73% of that of positive correlation ($5.16/$7.05) under no time tion of time processing information related to the most pressure, but only 67% of that for positive correlation opportunity-cost time pressure (and thus lead to a positive correlation between the index and performance), ($2.92/$4.37) with opportunity-cost time pressure. Thus, H4b is supported.
because of the loss in value expected if a decision maker responds to negative correlation gamble sets by inAdaptivity to correlation, performance, and time pres-creasing his or her acquisition of information and time sure. Bettman et al. (1993) examined the degree to to make the decision, lowering selectivity, and increaswhich an individual's adaptivity to correlation was re-ing processing by alternative. lated to performance by looking at the responses to
As noted under Method for Experiment Two, the eight pairs of gamble sets in which the two sets in a stimuli used in the current experiment were a subset pair had the same probabilities, although correlation (4 sets of 8) of the stimuli used in Bettman et al. (1993) . levels differed across the two gamble sets.
12 In particu-Using the same method for relating processing differlar, the differences between the positive correlation ences (positive-negative) and performance described gamble set and the paired negative correlation gamble above, we found that the correlation between the comset were computed for five processing variables (ACQ, posite measure of processing differences and average TIME, VARATT, VARALT, and PATTERN). These dif-PAYOFF was in the right direction for the no time ferences indicated the extent to which each subject pressure trials but was not quite significant (r Å 0.07, p adapted to the level of correlation. For each pair of õ .12; recall that the negative sign implies that greater gamble sets, Bettman et al. also calculated a measure adaptivity leads to better performance). Thus, there of performance, i.e., accuracy of choices. They then was an indication that those subjects who adapted tested the extent to which the degree of adaptivity in more to different correlation levels performed better processing was related to performance by pooling the when there was no opportunity-cost time pressure. In data for the eight gamble set pairs per subject over all contrast, the correlation between the composite measubjects and correlating a composite index formed from sure of processing differences and average performance the processing difference scores with the average per-was significant and in the opposite direction when triformance scores. The index was formed by standardiz-als involving opportunity-cost time pressure were exing the differences for each processing variable and amined (r Å .16, p õ .001). That is, those subjects who reversing the signs for VARATT and VARALT (because adapted less to different correlation levels performed more adaptivity in response to negative correlation better on decision problems that also involved opportuwould normally be associated with higher values for nity-cost time pressure. These results support H4c. ACQ, TIME, and PATTERN, but lower values of VAR-ATT and VARALT). Those subjects who adapted more Discussion to different correlation levels were better performers: the correlation between the composite score of proExperiment Two replicated a major result of Expericessing differences and performance in Bettman et al. ment One, a time pressure by goal interaction for pay-(1993) was significant and in the expected direction (r offs. Once again, an accuracy goal increased payoffs in Å 0.15, p õ .01; the sign of the correlation is negative the absence of time pressure but decreased payoffs unbecause more negative differences between positive der opportunity cost time pressure. In addition, and and negative correlation should correspond to higher importantly, we found similar evidence for limits to average performance levels (e.g., greater negative dif-adaptivity involving correlation and time pressure. ferences for ACQ for positive-negative correlation con-Both a significant time pressure by correlation interacditions would be expected to correspond to higher aver-tion and a more detailed analysis of adaptivity and age performance)).
performance showed that adapting to correlation in As stated in H4c, in Experiment Two of the present ways that are helpful without time pressure can be paper we expect a similar correlation pattern between harmful to performance when opportunity-cost time processing differences and performance for the trials pressure is present. These findings provide strong supwith no time pressure (i.e., a negative correlation, indi-port for our contention that adaptivity may suffer when cating that performance increases with greater adap-decisions must be made in environments with multiple tivity). However, based on the simulation results pre-aspects which conflict in their implications for adaptive sented earlier, we expect that greater adaptivity to lev-processing. els of correlation will hurt performance under GENERAL DISCUSSION 12 In the current paper, we only had such matched sets in ExperiPeople generally adapted well to individual properment Two. Therefore, the adaptivity analysis reported below could not be carried out for Experiment One. ties of the choice task in our experiments. When faced with opportunity-cost time pressure, subjects generally strategies. The inability to execute a strategy might be due to memory and computational difficulties caused adapted by processing less information, being more selective in their processing, and processing more by at-by the complexity of the task and/or by various environmental stressors (see Siegler, 1989 , for a related discustribute, replicating previous findings (Payne et al., 1988) . Subjects also adapted to changes in goals by sion).
The present results may be interpreted in terms of exhibiting more effort, less selectivity, and more alternative-based processing under an accuracy goal. Fi-several of these potential sources of failure in adaptivity. It is likely that subjects' a priori estimates of the nally, the main effects of the context variables, dispersion in probabilities and correlation between outcomes, impact of opportunity-cost time pressure on expected payoffs were vague, and although subjects carried out were also consistent with adaptivity from the perspective of a decision maker concerned with both accuracy several practice trials and did adapt their processing to opportunity-cost time pressure, their knowledge of and effort. Taken together, the present results clearly add to the evidence that people are intelligent, if not the impact of opportunity-cost time pressure on payoffs may have been inadequate. Subjects may have focused optimal, processors of information when they only have to take one property of the choice task into account. on responding to goals or correlation and inadequately compensated for time pressure. Generally, individuals However, the present results also suggest conditions involving interactions between variables where may have problems in adaptation when the implications of adapting to individual aspects of the choice people may fail to adapt. In particular, in both of the present experiments we found that the goal of environment conflict (e.g., adapting to an accuracy goal or to negative correlation conflicts with what is remaximizing accuracy can interfere with the need to adapt to opportunity-cost time pressure. We showed quired for adapting to time pressure).
A second, related explanation for the failure in that an accuracy goal leads to better performance when there is no time pressure, but an effort goal adaptivity is that subjects' responsiveness to the goals of accuracy and effort was ''disproportionate'' (Kleinis associated with higher payoffs under opportunitycost time pressure. We also found in Experiment Two muntz & Schkade, 1993). The instructions to emphasize accuracy or effort were given before each decision that those subjects who responded more to the correlations between outcome values did better in the no problem, which may have increased the subjective weight given to the goal manipulation. time pressure condition, while those subjects who responded less to the correlations did better under op-A third possibility is that the time stress generated by the need to pay attention to the clock in the opportuportunity-cost time pressure. Thus, our finding that people may have trouble adapting to multiple, con-nity-cost conditions may have interferred with the abilities of the subjects to execute their chosen strategies flicting properties of the decision situation was replicated both across different experiments and across (see Eysenck, 1984 , for the related idea that anxiety reduces short-term storage capacity and attentional different combinations of task and context factors.
Note that any discussion of failures or successes in control). However, our main effect results show that our subjects shifted their processing patterns in preadaptivity depends on acceptance of some standard for what is meant by better versus poorer performance on dicted directions as a function of goals, correlational structures, and opportunity-cost time pressure, sugthe task. In addition, this standard must be shared by both the subjects and the researchers. For a general gesting that a simple explanation based upon a general degradation of performance is not adequate. discussion of alternative views of achievement on judgment tasks, see Hammond (1990) .
Finally, as noted above, subjects may have tried to optimize on a criterion considering effort as well as payoffs. However, the fact that subjects under time Failures of Adaptivity pressure and accuracy goals received lower payoffs and Two major classes of factors associated with potential also took more time does not seem consistent with this failures in adaptivity exist. First, being adaptive re-possibility. Whatever the exact reason for the failure quires various types of knowledge. Deficits in knowl-in adaptivity exhibited by our subjects, it is clear that edge can include difficulties in assessing the task and both accuracy goals and negative correlation interacted context factors characterizing the decision environ-with opportunity-cost time pressure to lower subjects' ment, lack of knowledge of appropriate strategies, not payoffs. being able to veridically assess the effort and/or the Motivated Decisions accuracy of a strategy in a particular situation, and not knowing one's desired accuracy-effort tradeoffs.
In a recent article, Pelham and Neter (1995, p. 581 ) ask ''What are the judgmental consequences of being a Second, being adaptive requires the ability to execute
